Title

Griffins, Unicorns, and the Empty Set: A Defense of Trope Theory

Date

5-29-2014 3:00 PM

End Time

29-5-2014 3:30 PM

Location

Bellamy Hall (HSS) 336

Department

Philosophy

Session Chair

Ryan Hickerson

Session Title

Philosophy Department, Senior Theses

Faculty Sponsor(s)

Ryan Hickerson

Presentation Type

Presentation

Abstract

This paper is about a general dispute between realism and nominal’s pertaining to the existence of universals. Realists believe that something, a universal, is exemplified whenever we identify many particulars as of the same type. Nominalists do not believe in such universals, at least not as explained by the realists. This argument is an old one, but it is still relevant for philosophers today. The focus of this paper will be defending a more recent type of nominal’s, called trope theory, against the modern-day realists who ironically claim that tropes do not exist.

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May 29th, 3:00 PM May 29th, 3:30 PM

Griffins, Unicorns, and the Empty Set: A Defense of Trope Theory

Bellamy Hall (HSS) 336

This paper is about a general dispute between realism and nominal’s pertaining to the existence of universals. Realists believe that something, a universal, is exemplified whenever we identify many particulars as of the same type. Nominalists do not believe in such universals, at least not as explained by the realists. This argument is an old one, but it is still relevant for philosophers today. The focus of this paper will be defending a more recent type of nominal’s, called trope theory, against the modern-day realists who ironically claim that tropes do not exist.